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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WESLEY MULHERIN,

)

Plaintiff-Appellant,

)

v.

)

INGERSOLL.-R.AND COMPANY,

Case No·,

17027

)

Defendant.-Respondent~

)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN REPLY TO
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a strict liability action instituted by
Wesley Mulherin for damages caused by accidental activation
of an air winch manufactured by Ingersoll-Rand Company,

DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
This Court by opinion dated May 4, 1981, reversed
and remanded to the trial court, holding that the defense of
misuse in a product liability action is to be compared by the
trier of fact to the product defect and plaintiff's recovery
diminished by the degree in which his own fault contributed as
a proximate cause of his injury.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The pertinent facts are fully rehearsed in appellant's
original brief on appeal.
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ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Should the 50 percent cut ... off imposed.upon a

plaintiff•· s recovery by the Utah. Comparative. Negligence Act,
§

78-27-37, Utah Code Ann., (as amended), require that this

Court impose a similar limitation upon plaintiff'· s ·recovery
in this action, s·hould

plaintiff~·s

contributory fault (consti-

tuting the available defenses of misuse or assumption of risk)
be found by the trier of fact to equal or exceed the actionable conduct of defendant?
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
MANUFACTURERS OF DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS
ARE NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE SUBJECT
TO THE SAME STANDARDS AS NEGLIGENT
TORTFEASORS
Respondent's· brief argues that manufacturers of
defective products should not be treated differently from other
parties to tortfeasors.

A brief examination of current law and

the underlying social policies involved reveals that such a contention is totally without merit.
It is axiomatic that the public policy which resulted
in judicial adoption of strict liability for defective products
was one of practicality.

(Restatement of Torts 2d,

§

402A).

It was recognized that manufacturers and distributors were profiting from the sale of both defective and nondefective products.
At common law, absent a showing of negligence, a manufacturer
could continue to profit from the sale of its unreasonably dangerous products.

That situation differs radically from that of

a negligent driver who has nothing to gain by causing or allowing his negligence to injure another.

This Court and others

adopting strict liability, therefore, held that a showing a
product was unreasonably dangerous. and caused harm while being
used in a normal manner was sufficient to support recovery.
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Hahn v. Armco Steel Co., 601P.2d152 (Utah 1979), expressly
adopted these doctrines in Utah,
A problem connnon to all tort actions is that of achieving inherent fairness in the allocation of fault.

The Utah

legislature addressed this problem in negligence actions by
its adoption of the Utah Comparative Negligence Act,
Utah Code Ann. (as amended).

§ 78.-27~37 1

While this provision bars plain,.

tiff's recovery where his own negligence is equal to or greater
than the defendants, it must be remembered that in the vast
majority of ordinary negligence cases the plaintiff has suffered
damages as well as the defendant.

In a products liability case

it is difficult to conceive of a manufacturer ever being injured.
The manufacturer not only has no exposure to harm, but it has
benefited from the sale of the.

product~

By adopting a pure compare

tive standard in the apportionment of fault in a products liability
action, this Court recognizes the motivating principle behind
adoption of the strict liability doctrine, which is that one who
benefits from the sale of the defective product is in the best
pqsition to prevent or explain the defect and to pay for damages
resulting from the defect.
Respondent argues that by adoption of the Utah Product
Liability Act,

§ 78..,15~1,

et seq., Utah Code Ann. (as amended), the

legislature demonstrated its intention to treat manufacturers like
"everyone else''.

Even a cursory examination of these statutes

exhibit a disparity in treatment of a manufacturer and "everyone
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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else".

The Product Liability Act, in§ 78-15-13, provides a

limitation period of from six to ten years.

Any first year law

student would recognize the difference between this provision
and limitation periods provided for negligence related actions;
i.e., one year for actions against governmental entities, two
years for actions for wrongful death, one to two years for medical
malpractice and four years for most other negligence actions.
To argue, as does respondent, that the Product Liability Act
equalizes technical application of the law of torts among manufacturers of defective products and "everyone else" is to ignore
reality.
Finally, respondent suggests a hypothetical "chamber
of horrorstt situation to support its contention that "pure" comparative principles should not apply in strict product liability
actions.

A plaintiff who is 40 percent at fault for his injuries

suffered from an exploding fire hydrant is able, under this Court's
decision in the instant case, to recover against a defendant
manufacturer who along with two other defendants is each 20 percent
at fault in causing plaintiff's injuries.

It is difficult to

imagine such a result from a jury verdict in any context other
than counsel's imagination.

For the sake of argument, however,

that possibility should be considered.

The inequitable nature

of a result where such a plaintiff, who is only 40 percent responsible for his injury, yet who is unable to recover 60 percent of
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his damages because he had the misfortune to look to three defen. dants rather than one is

obvious~

Who among the defendants in

such an action is in the best position to prevent and/or assume
responsibility for that portion of plaintiff "s injuries?
governmental entity supported by involuntary tax dollars?

The
The

contractor why may do only a handful of such installations, and
relies .upon the product to hold together?

It appears obvious

that the manufacturer who makes and markets thousands of such
hydrants yearly, reaps profits thereby, and controls the design
and quality of its product, is in the best position to prevent
or explain such accidents, and to respond in damages when a dangerous defect and proximate cause have been established; even
though the plaintiff's own conduct may have contributed in some
degree to his injury.
The plain fact is that an astute plaintiff will include
as parties defendant everyone whose negligence or other liabilityproducing conduct (including strict product liability) could conceivably be found by a jury to have contributed to his injury.
To penalize such a plaintiff by arbitrarily applying a 50 percent
no-recovery rule when his· fault equals or exceeds that of any
stri~t

liability defendant regardless of findings against other

defendants would require him to leave out of the action potential
defendants whose negligent conduct may have contributed to the
injury, and make an "all-or-nothing" attack on a single product
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liability defendant.

In that case, the remaining defendant

would quite naturally point to the missing defendants, and
juries are notoriously ready to blame those not present.
By far, the more fair and practical approach is to
apportion fault among the parties to such a product liability
action as this on the basis of pure comparative principles as
to the defective product, as this Court has chosen to do by its
opinion.

Any ordinary negligence claims against other defen-

dants may be handled according to the statute.

The alternative

course urged upon the court by respondent would produce both
uncertainty, unnecessary risk-taking in the selection of defendants, and inequitable outcomes based upon numbers imposed by
the jury upon the respective parties' fault.

The latter, and

most serious problem with that approach, is aggravated by Utah's
current law preventing the jury's being advised of the ultimate
effect of its apportionment of fault, McGinn v. Utah Power &
Light Co., 529 P.2d 423 (1975).
Respondent's plea for jucicial recognition of a claimed
similarity between manufacturers of defective products and "everyone else" whose fault causes injury disregards the fact that
current product liability law was created to benefit the injured
plaintiff who could not recover because at the time such manufacturers were considered and treated like "everyone else".
Both the court and legislature determined that there is a differ-
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ence and that such. manufacturing of defective products causing
injury should not be treated like "everyone else."
There is indeed a "double standard" which does and shoulci
apply in such situations.

The manufacturer or seller is properly

liable when its product is proven to be dangerously defective,
and to have caused injury while being used in a normal manner,
regardless of negligence.
guilty of negligence.

Anyone else must be proven to be

Tli.ose two theories of liability are poles

apart, and different or "double'' standards obviously apply to
the plaintiff's burden of proving fault.

Since a "double" stand-

ard already exists in the nature of proof required to support
a cause of action, how can respondent be heard to complain that

the application of pure comparative principles results in a double
standard?
It should be noted that th_e legal doctrine of strict
liability for defective products in Utah, the available defenses,
and manner of application of those defenses are all judiciallycreated law covering matters to which the legislature has never
addressed itself.

Had the legislature chosen to speak out in

this field, it should, of course, be heard.

Since it has not,

this Court is entirely free to create the law to apply and direct
the. manner in which it will apply.

The legislative action (and

inaction} in the field of negligence should in no way be considered as limiting this Court in its judicial development of
strict liability.
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CONCLUSION
Strict product liability and negligence actions are
entirely different creatures, to which different burdens of proof
and defenses apply.

Distinctions between the two are obvious,

and application of available defenses in different ways arises
from rational distinction between them.

There are substantial

underlying social, economic and legal justifications for the
defferences involved, and such distinctions may by no means be
considered as denials of equal protection.
This Court's decision stands at the forefront of the
developing body, of strict liability law, not only in Utah but
nation-wide.

Respondent's attempt to dilute the effect of that

decision by persuading the Court it really meant something other
that what it said should not be given serious consideration.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th day of August, 1981.

~--~~-

~THURBER

-~

~

Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
211 East Broadway, Suite 213
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
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This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing
Appellant's Brief in Reply to Respondent's Petition for Rehearing were hand delivered and served upon Richard H. Moffat and
John L. Young of MOFFAT, WELLING & PAULSEN, Attorneys for Defendan
Respondent, 261 East Broadway, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, UT
84111 this 11th day of August, 1981.
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